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INTRODUCTION
As of January 2014, around sixty-seven million people played the
popular online game League of Legends on a monthly basis.1 League
of Legends is a free-to-play online game that falls into the genre of
“Multiplayer Online Battle Arena” (MOBA).2 MOBAs generally
consist of two teams of players where each player controls a
character and various computer-controlled units that fight alongside
the players to destroy the opposing team’s base or main structure.3
A team wins once the opposing side’s base has been destroyed.4 In
League of Legends, players control characters called “champions” in
two opposing teams consisting of five players each.5 Players can pick
from a variety of different champions to play in a League of Legends
match.6 Players can also customize these champions’ appearances
with purchasable vanity items called “skins.”7 Following the com-
mon MOBA layout,8 the two opposing teams battle in a match where
1. See Paul Tassi, Riot’s ‘League of Legends’ Reveals Astonishing 27 Million Daily
Players, 67 Million Monthly, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2014, 4:24 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
insert coin/2014/01/27/riots-league-of-legends-reveals-astonishing-27-million-daily-players-67-
million-monthly/ [https://perma.cc/Y4GB-QGSP].
2. See Play for Free, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS, https://signup.leagueoflegends.com/en/over
view [https://perma.cc/8YQ9-9626]. There is no formal definition for MOBA, but the term is
understood as referring to a type of game “in which a player controls a single character in one
of two teams [and] [t]he objective is to destroy the opposing team’s main structure with the
assistance of periodically spawned computer-controlled units that march forward along set
paths.” See Multiplayer Online Battle Arena, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi
player_online_battle_arena [https://perma.cc/YC2W-573H] (last modified Jan. 16, 2017); see
also DrFish, Comment to What Does MOBA Really Mean and What Characterizes Games That
Belong to That Genre?, ARQADE (May 30, 2011, 4:16 PM), http://gaming.stackexchange.com/
questions/23572/what-does-moba-really-mean-and-what-characterizes-games-that-belong-to-
that-genr [https://perma.cc/9TGM-39AQ].
3. See supra note 2.
4. See supra note 2.
5. See Game Info, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS, http://gameinfo.na.leagueoflegends.com/en/game-
info/ [https://perma.cc/7LRW-EEMQ]; Welcome to League of Legends, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS,
http://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/featured/new-player-guide#/ [https://perma.cc/ VD2Y-34YD]
[hereinafter Welcome to LoL] (referring to the video on the first page for information about
how to play the game, the mechanics of the game, and how the generic MOBA setup operates
specifically in League of Legends).
6. See Game Info, supra note 5.
7. See Champion Skin, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS: WIKI, http://leagueoflegends.wikia.com/wiki/
Champion_skin [https://perma.cc/XY3Y-W3JQ].
8. See supra note 2.
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the objective is to destroy the opposing team’s base, which is called
the “nexus.” A typical match is around forty-five minutes long,9 and
although the objective always remains the same—destroy the
opposing team’s nexus—each match is unique in that a player can
always choose a different champion, be teamed with different
players and different champion combinations, and make new
decisions regarding how to play their specific champion in each
match.10
Although League of Legends purports to be a free-to-play
game11—and it is quite possible to play League of Legends without
ever spending a penny—the option to make microtransactions
within the game exists.12 A microtransaction is the ability to make
a purchase within a game.13 Generally, a microtransaction provides
a player with the opportunity to purchase extra content created for
a game after the game has already been released.14 In League of
Legends, microtransactions allow players to purchase a type of
currency called “Riot Points.”15 Players can use Riot Points to buy
virtually everything in the store,16 and, in fact, there are some
9. See Hamitay, Comment to Average Game Length in Dota 2 vs. LoL, GAMESPOT (Apr.
2012), http://www.gamespot.com/forums/pc-mac-linux-society-1000004/average-game-length-
in-dota-2-vs-lol-29113042/ [https://perma.cc/HB3J-QBHC].
10. See League of Legends, KEENGAMER, http://www.keengamer.com/Game/league-of-
legends/detail [https://perma.cc/P3LM-XYSU]; Chipteck, New Champion Select, RIOT GAMES,
https://support.riotgames.com/hc/en-us/articles/207267266-New-Champion-Select [https://
perma.cc/7BUE-3P6N] (last updated Feb. 8, 2017, 12:39 PM).
11. See Play for Free, supra note 2.
12. See How to Unlock a Champion, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS, http://na.leagueoflegends.com/
en/featured/new-player-guide?source=http://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/site/guide/#/leveling-
up/future-milestones/unlock-a-champion [https://perma.cc/84TQ-SDKX].
13. See Dave Smith, I Miss the Days when I Only Had to Pay Once for a Video Game, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 22, 2015, 12:29 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/microtransactions-are-
ruining-video-games-2015-4 [https://perma.cc/J4HM-7D6M].
14. See id.
15. See How to Unlock a Champion, supra note 12.
16. Content called “runes,” an item that can boost the power and abilities of a champion,
are the only piece of in-game content that cannot be purchased with Riot Points. See Runes,
LEAGUE OF LEGENDS, http://gameinfo.na.leagueoflegends.com/en/game-info/summoners/runes/
[https://perma.cc/8KJ6-97QN]. Players can only purchase runes with accumulated in-game
currency referred to as “Influence Points.” See How to Unlock a Champion, supra note 12; see
also Future Milestones—Now What?, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS, http://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/
featured/new-player-guide?source=http://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/site/guide/#/leveling-
up/future-milestones [https://perma.cc/D739-UANJ].
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pieces of content that can only be purchased with Riot Points.17 One
of the most important microtransactions players make in League of
Legends is purchasing champions—players must have a champion
in order to play the game.18 Players can purchase champions with
real money via Riot Points or with an in-game currency called
“Influence Points,” which players earn through actually playing the
game.19 Although Influence Points can buy champions—thus poten-
tially eliminating the need to ever purchase Riot Points—the
amount of time it would take to earn enough Influence Points to
actually buy a champion is often so high that most players would
rather just spend real money to obtain their desired champion.20
Also available for purchase are the purely cosmetic skins, which
change the appearance of the champions—usually by changing the
champion’s clothing—but offer no advantage to the way the game is
actually played.21 Players, however, can only purchase skins with
real money via Riot Points.22 There are hundreds of items and cham-
pions that players can purchase through microtransactions, but in
the world of online gaming, these purchases do not give full property
rights to a player. Instead, players are merely purchasing licenses
to use the content, and game developers employ end user license
agreements (EULAs) to ensure that players will only maintain a
license interest in the content purchased through microtransac-
tions.23 Few League of Legends players probably understand that
when they make a microtransaction they only receive a license
17. See Riot Games to Bring Highly Anticipated League of Legends to the Community for
Free, RIOT GAMES (July 13, 2009) [hereinafter LoL for Free], http://www.riotgames.com/sites/
default/files/uploads/090713_NEWS_lol_lolforfree.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J7C-RMC9].
18. See id.
19. See How to Unlock a Champion, supra note 12.
20. One player calculated that it would take twenty-two months playing ten games a day
(roughly five hours of play time each day) to unlock every champion that was available in
2012. Subdue, Comment to Collecting All of the Champions?, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS: F. ARCHIVE
(Apr. 26, 2012), http://forums.na.leagueoflegends.com/board/showthread.php?t=2063230
[https://perma.cc/923A-Y3UA]. Since 2012, Riot has added more champions, but the player’s
analysis and math still make a strong argument highlighting how much easier it is for
someone to simply purchase the champions with real money than to spend nearly two years
slowly unlocking each champion one-by-one. See id.
21. See Champion Skin, supra note 7.
22. See LoL for Free, supra note 17.
23. See Steve Fishman, Why Use a License to Sell Software?, NOLO.COM, http://www.
nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/why-use-license-sell-software.html-0 [https://perma.cc/2RDZ-
EWEH] (indicating that the majority of software only grants a license to the purchaser).
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interest, but whether a player understands this distinction was
irrelevant until July 30, 2015, when Riot Games made the unpre-
cedented decision to remove a champion and all of its accompanying
vanity items from the game.24
On July 21, 2015, Riot released an event called “Bilgewater:
Burning Tides.”25 An “event” is extra, time-sensitive content that
players can choose to play or not play.26 Players who choose not to
participate in an event are not penalized in any way.27 The Burning
Tides event followed already-established and playable characters in
the League of Legends universe.28 Riot released the Burning Tides
event in story acts in which players essentially picked a side and
followed their chosen champion’s exploits—through written nar-
rative and special matches—to earn in-game rewards.29 When Riot
released Act III on July 30, 2015, players learned through the
written narrative on a companion website outside of the regular
game that the champion Gangplank was dead.30 In order to keep the
game consistent with the event’s storyline, Riot removed Gangplank
from the game completely, including from those players who did not
participate in the event.31
Many players took to the League of Legends forums to discuss
their dissatisfaction with Riot’s removal of the character.32 One
24. See Steven Bogos, League of Legends’ Gangplank Has Been Removed from Play,
ESCAPIST (July 30, 2015, 5:18 AM), http://www.escapistmagazine.com/news/view/141819-
Leage-of-Legends-Champion-Gangplank-Removed-From-The-Game [https://perma.cc/6FV5-
BJSF].
25. See Moobeat, Bilgewater: Burning Tides—Act One, SURRENDER AT 20 (July 21, 2015,
7:51 PM), http://www.surrenderat20.net/2015/07/bilgewater-burning-tides-act-one.html [https:
//perma.cc/4PF7-K8ZP].
26. See Easter Eggs/Events, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS: WIKI, http://leagueoflegends.wikia.com/
wiki/Easter_eggs/Events [https://perma.cc/AAF2-N3VN] (“Events ... are extraneous goals
meant to deliver lore to players in more exciting ways than the Journal of Justice or champion
backgrounds.”).
27. There is no penalty for not participating because the point of the event is to provide
lore or background information about the game. See id.
28. See Moobeat, supra note 25.
29. See id.
30. See Act Three—Part Three: Fire and Rain, a Conclusion, Turn for the Worse, LEAGUE
OF LEGENDS, http://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/site/bilgewater/#story-3 [https://perma.cc/38EL-
5GAL].
31. See Bogos, supra note 24.
32. See Pearl Millet, Nefas & Victoryensured, Comments to Act 3: Questions About the
Bilgewater Event? We Got You Covered! [COMPLETED], LEAGUE OF LEGENDS BOARDS HOME:
HELP & SUPPORT, http://boards.na.leagueoflegends.com/en/c/help-support/tXjcpYAU-act-2-
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player even indicated that he had just purchased a skin for Gang-
plank two days prior to Gangplank’s removal, and that had he
known the champion would no longer be available for play, he would
not have spent the money on the champion.33 When some players
asked for refunds for either the champion himself, or the various
skins—that could only be purchased with real money via Riot
Points—Riot responded that there would be no refunds.34 However,
on August 3, Gangplank was returned to the game when players
learned in the Epilogue that he was never actually dead.35
Although the champion Gangplank was removed from play, and
really the entire game server, only for about a week, the Burning
Tides event elicited a strong reaction from the player base.36 For the
first time in League of Legends, an item that players had purchased
was taken from gameplay without a refund.37 At least on League of
Legends forums, no one seemed to question Riot’s legal right to
remove the champion without compensation,38 but the question this
Note seeks to answer is whether Riot should have the legal right to
unilaterally remove content purchased with real money through
microtransactions. Although the issue in League of Legends’ case is
moot because Gangplank ultimately returned to gameplay, the
Burning Tides event helps demonstrate the underlying issue—that
questions-about-the-bilgewater-event-we-got-you-covered [https://perma.cc/E8KZ-44HS]
[hereinafter Questions About the Bilgewater Event] (last updated Aug. 24, 2015). Various
users indicated their dismay at the situation, but the comments posted by users Pearl Millet,
Nefas, and Victoryensured are quite telling about how the players generally do not under-
stand why a champion would be removed permanently for nongame play reasons. Id.
33. See id. (referring to the comment by user Pearl Millet: “why did you remove GP from
the game permanently? i literally just bought a skin for him two days ago and now i cannot
use it. now what you are telling me is that he is no longer going to be in the game? rolls eyes
you may have lost me as a customer”).
34. See Bogos, supra note 24.
35. See Epilogue: Chaos, The Ruined Man, Purpose, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS, http://na.league
oflegends.com/en/site/bilgewater/#story-4 [https://perma.cc/W6FS-E4VS]; Kris Wouk, ‘Dead’
League of Legends Champion Gangplank Returns, Players Get a Free Skin, DIGITAL TRENDS
(Aug. 3, 2015, 5:39 AM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/gaming/league-of-legends-gangplank-
returns/ [https://perma.cc/AF6C-K8N3].
36. See Questions About the Bilgewater Event, supra note 32 (referring to comments by
Pearl Millet, Nefas, and Victoryensured for discussion regarding the removal of Gangplank).
37. See id. (referring to the comment by user Hexwater indicating that there are no
refunds and that Gangplank has been completely removed from the game, not just gameplay,
as he is even unavailable for purchase).
38. See id. (referring to comments by users Hexwater and Pearl Millet, indicating that
users seemed to only be expressing their annoyance).
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game developer companies have complete, unilateral control over
access to content purchased through microtransactions.
Part I of this Note answers the question of whether Riot had the
legal right to remove the champion in the first place. This Part looks
into the history of EULAs, detailing how they have been applied in
software cases generally over the past decade and identifying how
a court would likely rule if a disgruntled player during the Burning
Tides event had tried to bring action against Riot for the removal of
Gangplank.
The following two Parts address whether Riot should have the
right to unilaterally remove in-game content, like Gangplank. This
Note argues that Riot should not have this unilateral power, at least
in League of Legends’ unique and specific instance. This Note
acknowledges that Riot maintains ownership of all of its content,
whether the content was purchased with real money or in-game
currency. The central argument of this Note regarding the balance
of game developer and player rights relies not on intellectual prop-
erty theories of authorship or ownership, but instead on contract
theories. Part II specifically focuses on whether average League of
Legends players, based on the EULA, could predict that they might
lose the in-game content they purchased through microtransactions.
The underlying argument that this Part considers is that no player
would reasonably expect to lose access to content purchased through
microtransactions. Therefore, Part II begins the discussion of the
issue with regards to the common-law reasonable expectations
doctrine. This Part starts with an explanation of how the doctrine
developed, then it discusses how the doctrine has been used
generally in the past, and finally it concludes with why the doctrine
should be applied in cases involving microtransactions, especially in
the case of League of Legends.
Part III then analyzes the player’s rights in microtransaction
content through the use of reliance theory, specifically following the
principles of promissory estoppel. This Part operates as an alterna-
tive theory to the reasonable expectations doctrine in how to balance
a player’s rights with the rights of the game developer. Although
both theories complement each other, this Note argues that either
theory could be used by a court when striking the balance between
the rights of a creator (the game developer) and the rights of a
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consumer (the player). Following a similar structure as Part II, Part
III explains the development of reliance theory and what kinds of
cases it has been applied to in the past and then concludes with an
argument as to why reliance damages could provide an adequate
remedy regarding purchases via microtransactions.
Through the exploration of the rationale behind the reasonable
expectations doctrine and reliance theory, this Note ultimately
concludes that under either theory EULAs should not be the end of
an analysis where a player has lost the ability to use content
purchased through microtransactions. Rather, this Note suggests
that Riot’s intellectual property interests in the in-game assets—the
items in the game such as champtions, skins, and so forth39—of
League of Legends must be balanced against the reasonable
expectations of the players, or should be balanced against a player’s
reliance on the implied promises underlying the ideas of consumer
protection. In this case, that would be that a player would have
access to purchased content.
39. See Oussama Bouanani, How to Fund Your Games by Creating and Selling Game As-
sets, GAMEDEVELOPMENT (July 24, 2015), https://gamedevelopment.tutsplus.com/articles/ how-
to-fund-your-games-by-creating-and-selling-game-assets--cms-24380 [https://perma.cc/ 8QKS-
BXJ7] (defining game assets as “everything that can go into a game, including 3D models,
sprites, sound effects, music, code snippets and modules, and even complete projects that can
be used by a game engine”).
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I. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK: END USER LICENSE
AGREEMENTS
League of Legends, like any online game, is essentially just a
piece of software. And similar to virtually all software—whether it
is entertainment, work, or task-related—League of Legends comes
equipped with an EULA that a player must assent to before he or
she can even install the game on his or her computer.40 This Part
explores the various EULA formats and details the legal history of
EULA enforceability before commenting on how the League of
Legends EULA would withstand judicial scrutiny in the face of the
Burning Tides event.
A. EULA History of Enforceability
An EULA simply states the terms of use between the manufac-
turer and the user.41 The vast majority of EULAs come in the form
of “click-wrap” agreements, where a list of boxes appears on the
user’s screen with a button that says “Next,” which the user will
continue to click until finally the button changes to “I accept” or “I
agree.”42 The provisions in an EULA cover a range of topics, from
explicitly giving only a license to mandating arbitration in the event
of a dispute.43 But tucked inside the pages upon pages of dull
legalese, manufacturers and developers have included clauses that
could expose users to potentially unforeseen liability.44 Other de-
velopers have poked fun at the fact that no one reads EULAs, and
40. See Fishman, supra note 23.
41. See Michael Terasaki, Do End User License Agreements Bind Normal People?, 41 W.
ST. U. L. REV. 467, 468 (2014).
42. See Rebecca K. Lively, Microsoft Windows Vista: The Beginning or the End of End-
User License Agreements as We Know Them?, 39 ST. MARY’S L.J. 339, 340-41 (2007).
43. See id. at 350-51, 350 n.69.
44. See Annalee Newitz, Dangerous Terms: A User’s Guide to EULAs, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 17, 2005), https://www.eff.org/wp/dangerous-terms-users-guide-eulas
[https://perma.cc/52RP-46BV] (listing examples of clauses that expose users to potentially un-
foreseen liability).
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some have even cleverly included clauses awarding cash prizes for
simply reading the clause buried in the EULA.45
Although a study found that maybe one or two people out of one
thousand actually read the EULAs,46 courts have continually upheld
the validity of numerous EULAs over the past decade.47 One of the
first cases that enforced standard form contracts, like EULAs, was
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.48 In that case, ProCD had compiled a
telephone directory software that it then sold to clients for commer-
cial and noncommercial uses.49 ProCD had two different prices
depending on which version the purchaser wanted to buy.50 The
noncommercial version of ProCD’s product included an enclosed
license with various restrictions.51 ProCD included the license in the
printed manual and the license appeared on the user’s screen every
time the user launched the program.52 Although the restrictions did
45. PC Pitstop’s EULA offered one thousand dollars if a user contacted them saying he
or she read the clause in the EULA that offered one thousand dollars. See Chris Hoffman, 10
Ridiculous EULA Clauses that You May Have Already Agreed To, MAKE USE OF (Apr. 23,
2012), http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/10-ridiculous-eula-clauses-agreed/ [https://perma.cc/
2PT2-RZ3L].
46. See Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to
Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 19-22, 21 tbl.4 (2014).
47. Lively, supra note 42, at 350.
48. See 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). ProCD is considered a “shrink-wrap” case. See
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW § 4.06 n.5, LexisNexis (database updated 2015).
Shrink-wrap licenses are typically documents found within off-the-shelf software
packages, printed on sealed envelopes containing the product’s media. These
documents usually provide that the purchaser of the package indicates assent
of the terms of the license by opening the package, by using the application, or
by failing to return the application to its point of sale within a specified time.
Id. § 4.06 (footnote omitted). When ProCD was decided in 1996, the term “click-wrap” had not
been established, but ProCD can be considered to have initiated the judicial analysis of “click-
wrap” cases nonetheless because on startup users had to check a series of boxes agreeing to
the license. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450, 1452 (“ProCD proposed a contract that a buyer would
accept by using the software after having an opportunity to read the license at leisure. This
Zeidenberg did. He had no choice, because the software splashed the license on the screen and
would not let him proceed without indicating acceptance.”); see also Specht v. Netscape
Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 593-94, 594 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“A click-wrap license
presents the user with a message on his or her computer screen, requiring that the user
manifest his or her assent to the terms of the license agreement by clicking on an icon.”), aff’d,
306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Lively, supra note 42, at 350 (“ProCD has been widely followed and
its principles have been extended to apply to clickwrap agreements as well.”).
49. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1449.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 1450.
52. See id.
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not appear on the outside of the box—meaning the user could not
read the terms prior to purchasing the product—the Seventh Circuit
held that under the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-204(1),
“A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of such a contract.” A vendor, as
master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may
propose limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes
acceptance. A buyer may accept by performing the acts the
vendor proposes to treat as acceptance.53
In other words, as long as a purchaser or user merely had the oppor-
tunity to review the terms, the license is completely valid, regardless
of whether the user actually read the terms.54
Although there was a trend to find EULAs conscionable as long
as the purchaser had an opportunity to read the EULA,55 in 2001
the District Court for the Southern District of New York placed
some limitations on the enforceability of click-wrap EULAs in
situations where the end user’s assent to the agreement was
questionable. In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., Net-
scape offered the ability to download software programs over the
Internet.56 In order to download a program, the user clicked a tinted
box labeled “download.”57 Unlike the defendants in ProCD and M.A.
Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., Netscape’s only men-
tion of the EULA was in text at the bottom of the next screen
inviting—not requiring—users to view the EULA.58 Netscape did
not require users to read or view the EULA before beginning the
download.59
The court held that the users could only be bound by the EULA
if they agreed to it, and in this case, the users never agreed to the
53. Id. at 1452 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977)).
54. See id. at 1452-53; see also M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d
305, 313 (Wash. 2000) (en banc) (following the decision in ProCD and upholding EULAs as
long as there was an opportunity to read, understand, and evaluate the EULA).
55. See, e.g., M.A. Mortenson Co., 998 P.2d at 315-16.
56. 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
57. See id. at 588.
58. See id.
59. See id.
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EULA.60 In order for the EULA to be binding, Netscape needed to
ensure that the users assented to the agreement by preventing the
ability to download the software until users had read the EULA.61
The court found that the users did not assent to the agreement
because the users could click “download” without ever being
required to read the EULA.62 Specht’s holding clarified that EULAs
cannot be attenuated;63 checking the “I agree” box is extremely
important in determining user assent to EULAs.
By 2007 the courts had essentially laid down all of the ground-
work required to enforce EULAs—by click-wrap, shrink-wrap, or
otherwise. Summarizing the issue in Feldman v. Google, Inc., the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania concluded
that, when “determin[ing] whether a clickwrap agreement is en-
forceable,” courts must determine whether the user “had reasonable
notice of and manifested assent to the clickwrap agreement.”64
Additionally, “failure to read an enforceable clickwrap agreement ...
will not excuse compliance with its terms.”65 Because the text of the
EULA at issue in Feldman was displayed in a scrollable text box, a
preamble explicitly stated in bold type to read the terms and
conditions and to indicate assent,66 and because the user could not
continue with the program without checking that he or she
assented—the user would be returned to the webpage if he or she
did not check the check box—the court held that there was reason-
able notice and mutual assent.67 Therefore, the agreement was
enforceable.68 There has not been much change in the analysis of the
enforceability of EULAs, and as late as 2013, courts were still
upholding EULAs as valid and binding contracts.69
60. See id. at 591, 596.
61. See id. at 595-96.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
65. Id.
66. See id. at 237-38.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 238.
69. See, e.g., Rahimi v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 936 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1142, 1144 (N.D. Cal.
2013) (finding that a purchaser of a video game console agreed to the terms of an EULA that
appeared on his TV screen on the initial start of the console and would not allow the
purchaser to use the console until checking the “I agree” box).
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By following the cases from 1996 to 2013,70 it becomes clear that
courts are more than willing to enforce EULAs, especially when the
program cannot continue unless users check a box indicating their
assent to the agreement.71 The only time when courts have not
enforced an EULA is when the agreement is not clearly visible and
the user can easily access and use the program without indicating
assent to the EULA’s terms.72
B. Enforceability of the League of Legends EULA Based on
Current Case Law
In order for a court to find that the League of Legends EULA is
enforceable, the court must determine (1) that League of Legends
players had “reasonable notice” of the EULA; and (2) that players
“manifested assent to the clickwrap agreement.”73 In order to play
League of Legends, players must complete two specific tasks—they
must first create an account with League of Legends and then they
must download the game.74
When a player begins the process to make a new account, he or
she must select a username and password.75 Directly beneath the
username and password boxes there is a check box that the player
must click stating, “I agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Poli-
cy.”76 Both documents are hyperlinked, and if clicked, will take the
user to a separate webpage displaying the entire corresponding
document.77 If the player tries to select the “Play For Free” button
before checking the assent box, an error will appear stating, “This
field is required” in red text.78
70. For a comprehensive list of how various states have dealt with the enforceability of
clickwrap agreements, see generally Kevin W. Grierson, Annotation, Enforceability of
“Clickwrap” or “Shrinkwrap” Agreements Common in Computer Software, Hardware, and
Internet Transactions, 106 A.L.R.5th 309, 320-35 (2003).
71. See Rahimi, 936 F. Supp. 2d at 1142; Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 237-38.
72. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 595-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2001),
aff’d, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
73. See Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 236.
74. See Sign Up, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS, https://signup.na.leagueoflegends.com/en/signup/
index?realm_key=na [https://perma.cc/M3X9-SS6A].
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
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Furthermore, when a player attempts to download the game and
launches the installer application, the first screen that appears is
the entire text of the terms of use in a scrollable box where two
options are clearly visible at all times: “I accept the terms in the
License Agreement” and “I do not accept the terms in the License
Agreement.”79 The option to continue on to the next part of the setup
process prohibits the player from leaving the terms of use box until
the player has checked the “I accept” box.80
In League of Legends, a court would more than likely find that a
player both had “reasonable notice” and assented to Riot’s EULA81
because not only does Riot prevent a player from creating an
account without agreeing to the EULA, but Riot also requires
players to agree to the EULA a second time before downloading the
game to his or her computer.82 Unlike Specht, where a user could
download the program without checking a box indicating that he or
she accepted the EULA,83 Riot refuses to permit players to continue
in both the creation of an account and the download of the actual
game without first checking the “I accept” box.84
Therefore, attacking Riot’s EULA based on lack of assent or
invalid agreement would be unsuccessful. Like the plaintiff in
ProCD,85 a League of Legends player could try to argue that the
EULA was unconscionable. However, the third paragraph of the
EULA—in a readable font size and style—clearly states, “Please
read the terms of this Agreement carefully. By clicking the ‘Accept’
button below, or by using any of the Riot Services, you agree that
79. Installation application for League of Legends Setup, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS [hereinafter
League of Legends Installer], https://perma.cc/3WC3-UB7H.
80. See id.
81. On May 31, 2016, Riot edited its End User License Agreement. It now titles itself
simply as “Terms of Use” and refers to itself as the “Agreement” in the document. See Terms
of Use (NA), LEAGUE OF LEGENDS, http://na.leagueoflegends.com/legal/termsofuse#limited-
license [https://perma.cc/3ZUT-S2YJ] (last modified May 31, 2016). Not explicitly calling itself
an “End User License Agreement” does not prohibit the document from functioning and being
an EULA. Moreover, the installer application does, in fact, refer to the Terms of Use as a
“License Agreement.” See League of Legends Installer, supra note 79 and accompanying text.
For clarity of this Note, I will refer to the Terms of Use—the “Agreement”—as an EULA.
82. See League of Legends Installer, supra note 79; Sign Up, supra note 74.
83. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2001),
aff’d, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
84. See League of Legends Installer, supra note 79; Sign Up, supra note 74.
85. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
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this Agreement is enforceable like any written contract signed by
you.”86 In order to be unconscionable, the terms must be hidden,87
and here—just as in ProCD—the terms are quite clear.
Because the League of Legends EULA is not procedurally
unconscionable,88 and because players are required to give assent to
the EULA twice before ever being able to take a step onto the
“Summoner’s Rift,”89 a court would probably find that the EULA is
enforceable.90 The EULA and the terms of use—which users
acknowledge they have read and agree to when agreeing to the
EULA—both contain provisions that look like they would protect
Riot from liability when Riot decided to remove the champion
Gangplank during the Burning Tides event.91 The EULA states:
8.2. Will the Riot Services stay the same? (No. Like Kha’zix, they
will evolve.) ... [Y]ou agree that we may change, modify, update,
suspend, “nerf,” or restrict your access to any features or parts
of the Riot Services, including Virtual Goods,92 and may require
that you download and install updates to any software required
to support the Riot Services, at any time without notice or
liability to you.93
86. See Terms of Use (NA), supra note 81.
87. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453.
88. “‘[U]nconscionability has both a “procedural” and a “substantive” element,’ the former
focusing on ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on ‘overly
harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results.” Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669,
690 (Cal. 2000) (quoting A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 121-22 (1982)),
abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). “The prevailing view
is that [procedural and substantive unconscionability] must both be present in order for a
court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of
unconscionability.” Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 145 (1997). At issue with
League of Legends would be the procedural element of unconscionability as players are
probably unaware of exactly what their rights are. However, because it would be a very tough
argument to claim that a license to use the in-game assets is “overly harsh,” and therefore
substantively unconscionable, an unconscionability argument would most likely fail.
89. The “Summoner’s Rift” is a game mode for League of Legends and is the classic name
of the map used in a League of Legends match. See Game Modes, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS,
http://gameinfo.na.leagueoflegends.com/en/game-info/game-modes/ [https://perma.cc/B8SZ-
VNHA]. The Summoner’s Rift “remains the battleground of choice for the majority of players.
Two teams of five champions battle across three lanes and an expansive jungle.” Id.
90. Cf. Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
91. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
92. The EULA defines “Virtual Goods” as unlockable items including: champions, skins,
ward skins, summoner icons, runes, and boosts. See Terms of Use (NA), supra note 81.
93. Id.
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ing the idea of a player’s rights to virtual
4.3. Do I “own” the Virtual Goods I unlock? (No. What you
“unlock” is not the virtual good itself, but rather, a qualified
right to access it in the Game.) You have no ownership or other
property interest in any of the Virtual Goods you unlock,
regardless of whether you acquired access to those Virtual Goods
using Riot Points, Influence Points or Hextech Crafting.94
Both provisions indicate that Riot owes no liability to a player for
removing or changing game assets, such as champions, without
notice to the player.95 Because the EULA would probably be con-
sidered an enforceable click-wrap contract, these provisions would
be completely valid, and players would have no right to a refund or
remedy for the removal of Gangplank. However, should these
contracts be enforceable? Although not reading an agreement is not
grounds for claiming nonassent to the EULA,96 this Note argues
that in cases where players engage in microtransactions courts
should also consider—as part of their liability analysis—the
reasonable expectations doctrine or reliance theory when balancing
the rights of the player versus the rights of the game developer.
94. Id. Riot in fact takes this issue so seriously that it even restates the idea again in bold
type and in all caps:
4.4. Once again: I don’t own these Virtual Goods? (“No!” shouted all the lawyers.)
NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING TO THE CONTRARY HEREIN, YOU
ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT YOU SHALL HAVE NO OWNERSHIP
OR OTHER PROPERTY INTEREST IN YOUR ACCOUNT, AND THAT ALL
RIGHTS IN AND TO YOUR ACCOUNT ARE AND SHALL FOREVER BE
OWNED BY AND INURE TO THE BENEFIT OF RIOT GAMES. YOU
FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO CLAIM,
RIGHT, TITLE, OWNERSHIP, OR OTHER PROPRIETARY INTEREST IN
THE GAME CONTENT THAT YOU UNLOCK OR ACCUMULATE,
REGARDLESS OF ANY CONSIDERATION OFFERED OR PAID IN
EXCHANGE FOR RIOT POINTS OR VIRTUAL GOODS.
Id.
95. See id.
96. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
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II. THE REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS DOCTRINE
This Part examines the reasonable expectations doctrine and how
it relates to EULAs in video games. This Part first explores the legal
history of the reasonable expectations doctrine, addressing how it
developed, how it is currently being used today, how courts have
applied it to cases involving video games generally, and how courts
should apply it to the microtransactions involved in League of
Legends. Because contract law varies from state to state, this Part
will give a general overview of the reasonable expectations doctrine
and will use the consensus approach97 in its analysis and application
of the doctrine to the League of Legends EULA.
A. History and Development of the Reasonable Expectations
Doctrine
The reasonable expectations doctrine is a rule originally devel-
oped for the interpretation of insurance contracts.98 In 1970
Professor Robert Keeton defined the reasonable expectations
principle as how “[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of appli-
cants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance
contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the
policy provisions would have negated those expectations.”99 In other
words, a court can “refuse to enforce even clear and unambiguous
contract terms that conflict with what the court determines to be
the insured’s reasonable expectations.”100 Courts have used this
extrainterpretive tool because, generally, insurance contracts are
contracts of adhesion.101 The insureds often do not read the contract,
97. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the consensus ap-
proach.
98. See Laurie Kindel Fett, Note, The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine: An Alternative
to Bending and Stretching Traditional Tools of Contract Interpretation, 18 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1113, 1117 & n.21 (1992).
99. Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 961, 967 (1970).
100. Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1469 (1989).
101. An adhesion contract is a contract “drafted unilaterally by the dominant party and
then presented on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis to the weaker party who has no real opportunity
to bargain about its terms.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. b (AM.
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and unsophisticated parties—like insureds—need extra protec-
tion.102
One of the earliest cases to rely on the reasonable expectations
principles was Kievet v. Loyal Protective Life Insurance Co.103 Kievet
involved an accident insurance policy.104 The policy stated that it
would not cover injuries from accidents that occur due to a dis-
ease.105 The plaintiff, a healthy, forty-eight-year-old man, was
accidently hit over the eye with a wooden board, which caused him
to have tremors on the right side of his body.106 A doctor later diag-
nosed the plaintiff with having Parkinson’s disease and determined
that the disease became active after the accident.107 Because of his
diagnosis, the plaintiff’s insurance company refused to send him
payments, claiming that his disease was a contributing, disqualify-
ing factor to his injury and disability.108 The court reasoned that the
plaintiff never contemplated the idea that a dormant infirmity
would surface after an accident,109 and that those who purchase
insurance policies “are entitled to the broad measure of protection
necessary to fulfill their reasonable expectations. They should not
be subjected to technical encumbrances or to hidden pitfalls and
their policies should be construed liberally in their favor ... ‘to the
full extent that any fair interpretation will allow.’”110
Five years later, the Supreme Court of California likewise deter-
mined that the court would “resolve uncertainties [in an insurance
policy] in favor of the insured and interpret the policy provisions
according to the layman’s reasonable expectations.”111 The court
LAW INST. 1988).
102. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable
Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181,
186 n.5 (1998).
103. 170 A.2d 22 (N.J. 1961).
104. See id. at 23-24.
105. See id. at 24.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 25.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 30.
110. Id. at 26 (quoting Danek v. Hommer, 100 A.2d 198, 202 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1953), aff’d, 105 A.2d 677 (N.J. 1954) (per curiam)).
111. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 174-75 (Cal. 1966) (en banc). In this case,
the policy in contention was a comprehensive personal liability contract, which stated that the
insurance company would defend the insured in “any suit against the insured alleging ...
bodily injury.” Id. at 173. The insurance company refused to defend the plaintiff because the
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found the policy to be ambiguous, and concluded that “the insurer
bore the obligation to defend because the policy led plaintiff
reasonably to expect such defense.”112
In 1975 the Supreme Court of Iowa determined that, even when
terms are clearly defined and unambiguous in the contract, if the
insured was not aware of the definition, then the insured’s reason-
able expectations of the contract should govern.113 Because insureds
do not often read standardized form contracts, the insured typically
relies on conversations with insurance agents to understand and
assent to the provisions in the contract.114 The court determined
that insureds do not assent to “unreasonable or indecent terms the
seller may have on his form.”115 Evidence showed that the plaintiff
had not read the contract’s definition of a particular term—“bur-
glary”—and that he had relied upon the conversation he had with
the insurance agent to define that term.116 Therefore, the court held
that because “customers typically adhere to standardized agree-
ments and are bound by them without even appearing to know the
standard terms in detail, they are not bound to unknown terms
which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation.”117
Ten years later, the Supreme Court of Minnesota expounded on
the Supreme Court of Iowa’s decision by stating that ambiguity in
a contract’s language—whether the agent informed the insured of
important but obscure provisions, and whether particular provi-
sions are generally known—is a factor to consider when applying
the reasonable expectations doctrine.118 Although the court reasoned
that whether the insured knew about the terms of the contract is an
important factor in the analysis, the reasonable expectations
doctrine “does not automatically remove from the insured a
responsibility to read the policy ... [but] recognize[s] that ... where
plaintiff acted in self-defense and intentionally caused the injuries, which went against the
policy’s exclusionary clause. See id. at 174.
112. Id. at 176.
113. See C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 1975).
114. See id. at 174.
115. Id. at 175. 
116. See id. at 176-77.
117. Id. at 176 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST.
1981)).
118. See Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn.
1985).
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major exclusions are hidden in the definitions section, the insured
should be held only to reasonable knowledge of the literal terms and
conditions.”119
Because the reasonable expectations doctrine is based on state
common law, its application and usage varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.120 Pinpointing a majority view of the doctrine at this
time is difficult.121 Although Professor Keeton’s definition clearly
indicates that reasonable expectations of the consumer should be
considered even when there is “express language” in the contract
indicating otherwise,122 twenty-seven jurisdictions apply the
reasonable expectations doctrine only when there is an ambiguity.123
However, the application of the reasonable expectations doctrine
only to cases of ambiguity is essentially an extension of the contra
proferentem doctrine.124 Making matters even more troublesome,
many other jurisdictions have yet to indicate clearly their current
position on the matter.125 Only Hawaii and Alaska have been
confirmed to still completely adhere to Professor Keeton’s classical
definition of reasonable expectations that predominated the courts
from the 1970s to the mid-1990s.126
What the majority approach for reasonable expectations is, or
should be, goes beyond the scope of this Note.127 In 2000, however,
119. Id.
120. See David J. Seno, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law: What
to Expect in Wisconsin, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 859, 859-61 (2002).
121. See id. at 861.
122. See Keeton, supra note 99, at 967.
123. See Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 114-17
(2008).
124. See id. at 112, 114-17, 120-21 (indicating that twenty-seven jurisdictions have
conflated “the construction of ambiguities against the insurer with doctrine of reasonable
expectations”); see also Seno, supra note 120, at 859 (describing contra proferentem as a
“traditional rule” that “constru[es] ambiguous policy language against the insurance com-
pany”). 
125. See Randall, supra note 123, at 117-18; see also Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic
Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT &
INS. L.J. 729, 776 (2000) (“[A] majority of states still have not expressly adopted, or expressly
rejected, the Keeton doctrine of reasonable expectations, and apparently have chosen to ignore
this jurisprudential brouhaha.”).
126. See Randall, supra note 123, at 111-12; see also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn. v.
Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 517 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1994) (departing from Professor Keeton’s
definition and using reasonable expectations only in instances of ambiguity).
127. For more information regarding the debate of the reasonable expectations doctrine’s
place in the law, see generally Randall, supra note 123, at 111-18; Stempel, supra note 102,
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Professor Peter Swisher formulated what he calls the “consensus
approach” to the reasonable expectations doctrine.128 This approach:
provides a number of well-established contractual parameters
for allowing judicial discretion, when justice and equity requires
it, to recognize and honor the reasonable expectations of the
parties to coverage in insurance contract disputes that are
supplemental to—rather than at variance with—the terms of the
parties’ insurance contract.129
Particularly important to the consensus approach, and to this
Note’s argument, is how courts should interpret contracts of
adhesion and assent to boilerplate language.130 According to Profes-
sor Karl Llewellyn:
Instead of thinking about “assent” to boiler-plate clauses, we can
recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent
at all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few
dickered terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but
one thing more. That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a
specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the
seller may have on his form, which do not alter or eviscerate the
reasonable meaning of the dickered terms. The fine print which
has not been read has no business to [undercut] the reasonable
meaning of those dickered terms which constitute the dominant
and only real expression of agreement.131
For the purposes of this Note, the consensus approach, as articu-
lated in Swisher’s article, controls the analysis because it takes a
middle-ground position between conflating reasonable expectations
with contra proferentem and Professor Keeton’s classical approach.
at 189-201; Swisher, supra note 125, at 732-35.
128. See Swisher, supra note 125, at 732.
129. Id. at 778.
130. See id. at 760-61.
131. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960).
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B. The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine Examined in Prior
Literature Concerning Video Games
Although the reasonable expectations doctrine originated in the
context of insurance contracts, many courts have expanded the
doctrine’s scope to include “other standard form contracts as well.”132
In 2006, Michael Meehan analyzed the virtual property rights video
game players have in massively multiplayer online (MMO) games.133
Meehan looked at two forms of virtual property players could
accumulate: (1) in-game items and currency, and (2) the player’s
game account.134 Additionally, Meehan reasoned that the reasonable
expectations of the players in regards to these property rights can
differ depending on the status of the game at the moment.135 If a
game is continuing, a player in an MMO would reasonably expect to
not be arbitrarily terminated from the game and to not have his or
her virtual property arbitrarily destroyed.136 However, if a game
were to cease operations, then a player would reasonably expect to
lose his or her account and any virtual property associated with the
account.137 In other words, the termination of the game as a whole
is within the reasonable expectations of the player.138
Meehan argues that “there should be no remedy for termination
of a game” because game development companies can better assess
the cost of terminating a game.139 However, Meehan also argues
that if a game is continuing, then a player should be compensated
for his or her destroyed virtual property.140 Even if an MMO’s EULA
is clear that the ownership rights of both in-game property and the
132. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability
and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 27 (1993).
133. Michael Meehan, Virtual Property: Protecting Bits in Context, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH.,
no. 2, 2006, at 1, 1-7. An MMO will have thousands of players that can interact with one
another in a virtual world. See id. at 1.
134. See id. at 2.
135. See id. at 18.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 43.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 40, 44.
140. See id. at 44, 48. Specifically, Meehan argues that virtual property should be replaced
with equivalent virtual property before pursuing monetary relief. See id. at 44. “Where
restoration is not possible, monetary damages or equivalent virtual property might be
acceptable compensation.” Id. at 45.
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game account belong to the game’s developer, if the developer acts
against the players’ reasonable expectations regarding their ac-
counts, then courts may find those terms invalid.141
The material terms regarding how the player can interact with
the virtual world will also affect the reasonable expectations a
player may have regarding his or her virtual property and
account.142 If the material terms establish a narrative in which the
player just moves through what the developer has created, or the
player must play the game to advance through the story, then the
developer will be free to unilaterally destroy or alter content.143 In
this context, a “narrative” type game is a game where a player must
actually interact with and play the game in order to advance the
plot.144 Although the Burning Tides event was a story event, League
of Legends is not a narrative type game, as the player does not play
a League of Legends match to advance any kind of plot.145
On the other hand, if the material terms “establish a collaborative
environment where commoditized virtual objects are exchanged for
virtual or real currency, the court is likely to treat those objects as
it would any other object—subject to standard real-world property
law.”146 This distinction is critically important in the analysis of the
Burning Tides event because, despite the event’s companion story,
players interact with the League of Legends client through the
commoditization of virtual objects.147
C. The Reasonable Expectations of a League of Legends Player
League of Legends is currently still in operation,148 which places
it in the prong favoring the rights of the player.149 Like Meehan’s
argument concerning MMOs, a League of Legends player would not
141. See id. at 21.
142. See Jamie J. Kayser, Note, The New New-World: Virtual Property and the End User
License Agreement, 27 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 59, 70 (2006).
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See Welcome to LoL, supra note 5; see also Easter Eggs/Events, supra note 26; supra
notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
146. Kayser, supra note 142, at 70.
147. See supra notes 2, 11-22 and accompanying text.
148. That is, League of Legends was still in operation as of the writing of this Note.
149. See Meehan, supra note 133, at 44 n.154.
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expect his virtual property to be arbitrarily destroyed.150 However,
there is a key difference between the kind of virtual property a play-
er in an MMO has and that of a player in a MOBA. In an MMO, the
player has an avatar that he or she uses to interact with anything
in the virtual world, and this avatar is able to obtain, make, or
purchase different items.151 Additionally, the player has various
types of items and typically some kind of in-game currency.152
In contrast, in a MOBA there is not really a virtual world where
players interact with one another.153 When a player logs into his or
her account on League of Legends the game transports the player
to a staging screen where he or she can talk with other players
through chat boxes or queue for a match.154 Until the player begins
a match, the player cannot interact with champions or the game
world in any way.155 The kind of world experienced in the MOBA is
more akin to a chess board than a virtual world—which can be ex-
plored as experienced in MMOs—because players cannot explore the
MOBA world. In fact, the MOBA game world is often referred to as
a “map” instead of a “world” because the map will be the exact same
layout every time a player enters the game to play a match.156 So,
150. See id.
151. See Kayser, supra note 142, at 73-74, 74 n.116.
152. See id.
153. See Welcome to LoL, supra note 5.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. In League of Legends there are three different game modes that correspond to three
different maps where the players will play a League of Legends match. See Game Modes,
supra note 89. Although players can always pick any champion they want, the champions the
players control are the only game assets that vary from match to match. See id. The terrain,
nonplayer characters, and items available for purchase remain unchanged for the most
part—some game modes will restrict a few item choices. See id. Contrast this with a game
world in an MMO. If a player were to log into a particular game area and then reenter that
same area the next day there could be a drastic change in experience because the other
players directly affect the game world by harvesting items, attacking towns, and completing
quest objectives. See Meehan, supra note 133, at 1-2. The physical layout of the world is
altered by player interaction in an MMO, which can range from a flower being picked to
certain items being purchased by one player and now are unavailable for purchase to another.
But this is simply not the case in a MOBA. The purchases where a player buys a virtual good
in League of Legends all happen in the staging screen area of the game client, completely
outside the game world of the MOBA itself and completely outside any interaction with other
players. See PvP.net/Riot Store, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS: WIKI, http://leagueoflegends.wikia.com/
wiki/PVP.net/Riot_Store [https://perma.cc/2FZQ-SBRX] (showing pictures of the setup of store
in the game client (i.e. outside of the game map) and explaining what virtual goods can be
bought, how to buy them, and the layout of the store generally). MOBAs have two forms of
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considering the MOBA world as a chess board, the kind of items
players purchase are simply game pieces that cannot be used until
a match is started.
Meehan concluded that an MMO player would not reasonably
expect his or her virtual property to be arbitrarily destroyed.157 Even
though the property is different, a League of Legends player also
would not reasonably expect his or her virtual goods—the game
pieces of the chess board example—to be arbitrarily destroyed.
According to Meehan, if a certain player were singled out and not
able to use his or her account, or could not have access to a certain
item while others could, then that would be arbitrary.158 The same
reasoning would apply in League of Legends, but the argument
could extend even further to include arbitrary removal of champi-
ons. Champions in League of Legends can be thought of as items
under Meehan’s argument. As long as the League of Legends
servers are still operating, players expect to have full use and
control of the champions that they have purchased. The only time
a player expects a champion to be unavailable for play is during the
rare occurrences when there is a technical issue with the champion,
but this scenario still would not necessitate a complete removal of
the champion from the game, like what actually happened in the
Burning Tides event.
League of Legends is not a “narrative” type game where players
experience a story as they play.159 Although there is a general story
explaining the world of the game and the relationships of the
champions, the story is not the focus of the game. In fact, a player
learns zero percent of the general background or special story events
“transactions”: the virtual goods and items used during the actual game match. Virtual goods
are the things players buy in the client store. See Terms of Use (NA), supra note 81. Items, on
the other hand, are part of game mechanics in a League of Legends match. See Item Shop,
LEAGUE OF LEGENDS, http://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/featured/new-player-guide#/how-to-
play/item-shop?_k=eostrx [https://perma.cc/6L9F-BDDX] (explaining that items are equipped
to a champion and only purchased with gold accumulated during the match). Regardless if the
transaction is for an item or a virtual good, the other players will have no effect on one’s
ability to make a purchase because the items are not limited in quantity. Whereas in an
MMO, the items are usually limited by spawn timers. See Spawn, WOW: WIKI, http://wowwiki.
wikia.com/wiki/Spawn [https://perma.cc/Y3K4-NVGS] (explaining the limited resource of
items via the process of spawning, or entering the game world).
157. See Meehan, supra note 133, at 18.
158. See id.
159. See supra notes 26-30, 144 and accompanying text.
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from actually playing League of Legends. All of the story elements
are told outside of the actual game matches in champion profiles or
through story events that can only be read outside of the game
client.160 League of Legends is better analogized to a virtual board
game where players buy pieces in order to play the game with
others. When a player purchases a champion—a game piece—he or
she would reasonably expect to always have that champion in order
to play the game. If Riot were to remove the champion from the
game, then the player would expect to be compensated so that he or
she could purchase a new game piece and continue playing the
game.
Although the Burning Tides event was essentially a story, players
did not learn the story through playing a League of Legends match,
nor did it impact the game’s mechanics—other than removing one
of over one hundred champions from play. The Burning Tides event
was merely something extra that players could elect to read or
participate in without affecting the mechanics and purpose of a
League of Legends match. Riot removed Gangplank from play to
conform with an elective side project that had no impact whatsoever
on the actual match mechanics. Because a champion, like Gang-
plank, should be considered a game piece, a champion’s removal to
coincide with an extraneous story would be equally arbitrary and
unexpected by players.
Jamie Kayser also argued that players in an MMO would have
property rights in a “collaborative environment” with “commoditized
virtual objects,”161 but the conclusion does not translate as easily to
a MOBA, like League of Legends, because there is no collaborative
environment in the game.162 The players do not create an avatar, a
champion, or any kind of item.163 The only control the player has in
160. See Champions, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS, http://gameinfo.na.leagueoflegends.com/en/
game-info/champions/ [https://perma.cc/QXQ2-8YH6]; see also Lore, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS:
WIKI, http://leagueoflegends.wikia.com/wiki/Category:Lore [https://perma.cc/Z4LL-JFUK] (list-
ing “[a]ll articles about the story of League of Legends, not the game itself”).
161. See Kayser, supra note 142, at 70.
162. See Welcome to LoL, supra note 5 (explaining how the game is played in set matches
with players making choices based off of already created assets and indicating that there is
no instance in which a player will create or contribute his or her own personal ideas into the
game world).
163. See id.
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a MOBA is the customization of his or her champion within a single
match.164
Although there is no collaboration, players can buy—and even
have the option to trade to other players—champions, skins, and a
few other miscellaneous items through the use of microtransac-
tions.165 Using a microtransaction to purchase an item could be
considered a “commoditized virtual object,” which leans toward
there being some kind of reasonable expectation right in the
property.166 During the Burning Tides event, the “commoditized
virtual objects” were the champion Gangplank himself and his seven
obtainable skins.167 Only the champion could be purchased with in-
game currency and, even then, players still had the option to
purchase Gangplank with real money.168 Further, players could
purchase the skins only with real money.169 Players had an expecta-
tion of a property right in the champion and the skins purchased for
the champion because both the champion and his skins were
commoditized with real money via microtransactions.
Although the League of Legends EULA specifically negates
granting property rights to a League of Legends player,170 the
reasonable expectations doctrine should be applied to reach a more
favorable balance between the developer and player, especially since
microtransactions are involved. There are no ambiguous terms in
the EULA, but, like in C & J Fertilizer, the average user does not
likely read the provisions explicitly detailing his or her property
rights.171 And because the terms explicitly stating that there is no
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See Kayser, supra note 142, at 70.
167. Cf. id. For a list of Gangplank’s available skins, see Gangplank, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS,
http://gameinfo.na.leagueoflegends.com/en/game-info/champions/gangplank/ [https://perma.cc/
5HX6-96PP].
168. See How to Unlock a Champion, supra note 12.
169. See Champion Skin, supra note 7 (listing the different types of skins in the game and
their purchase price). Generally speaking, skins can only be purchased with Riot Points. See
id. Only in very rare circumstances can skins be obtained without using Riot Points—the
“victorious” skins are the best example as they are given to players for reaching a certain rank
in the game and as of the writing of this Note, there are only six of these victorious skins, and
they cannot be obtained any longer. See id.
170. See Terms of Use (NA), supra note 81.
171. See C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 1975);
Bakos et al., supra note 46, at 1.
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property interest in “virtual goods” were not likely read,172 the
typical League of Legends player would reasonably expect to main-
tain control over any purchased champions, skins, or items for as
long as League of Legends continues to operate.
III. RELIANCE THEORY
Just as Part II follows the consensus approach to the reasonable
expectations doctrine, this Part follows the majority’s view of
reliance theory, specifically tracking the elements for a claim of
promissory estoppel. This Part first details the history of reliance
theory173 and then moves to its application in video game EULAs
generally.174 Finally, this Part concludes with an analysis of the
League of Legends EULA under reliance principles, specifically
looking at how microtransactions have commodified in-game
assets.175 Central to this Part’s argument is how commodification
and consumer protection trigger reliance principles and should
override the EULA constraints on liability.
A. History and Development of Reliance Theory and Damages
According to Professor Eric Holmes, reliance theory stems from
promissory estoppel when courts “focus[ ] on the promisee’s right to
rely and the promisor’s duty to prevent (or not cause) reasonably
foreseeable harmful reliance.”176 Consideration is necessary in order
172. Cf. Bakos et al., supra note 46, at 1.
173. See infra Part III.A.
174. See infra Part III.B.
175. See infra Part III.C.
176. Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 263,
288 (1996). “A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement
of the promise.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1932).
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as
justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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to have an enforceable promise,177 and Corbin explains that “one
who acts in reliance on a promise is acting ‘in respect of the prom-
ise.’”178 In other words, acting—or forbearing—based on the reliance
that a promisor will act—or not act—is adequate consideration to
make a promise enforceable.179 Additionally, because the promisor
is in a better position to prevent the harm caused by a promisee’s
detrimental reliance, the promisor must compensate the prom-
isee.180
In 1963 the Supreme Court of Tennessee used reliance theory as
defined in the First Restatement of Contracts to establish that an
insurance adjuster may be liable for the medical bills of an insured
when he makes an oral promise to the insured and the insured
relied on that promise.181 In that case, an insurance adjuster
promised to pay the medical bills for plaintiff’s injuries if plaintiff
would not hire an attorney.182 However, the insurance adjuster later
refused to pay the plaintiff’s medical bills, and by that time, the
statute of limitations for the plaintiff to file a tort claim had run.183
Although the issue of whether the contract actually existed is a
question for the jury, the court explained that the promise might
become enforceable because the plaintiff relied on the insurance
adjuster’s promise and acted on that reliance when he did not hire
an attorney.184 In other words, the plaintiff’s forbearance was
“sufficient consideration for the [insurance adjuster’s] promise.”185
Around twenty jurisdictions use reliance theory, based on the
promissory estoppel claim of action, to enforce promises in con-
tracts.186 Two states have even codified reliance theory in statutes.187
177. See generally 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:11 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated
May 2015).
178. 3-8 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 8.2 (2015) (quoting Currie v. Misa [1875] 10 LR Exch. 153
at 162).
179. See id.
180. See Holmes, supra note 176, at 289-90.
181. See Jackson v. Kemp, 365 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tenn. 1963); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1932).
182. See Jackson, 365 S.W.2d at 438.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 440.
185. Id. at 439 (quoting 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 218).
186. See Holmes, supra note 176, at 289.
187. The Georgia statute can be found at GA. CODE ANN. § 13-3-44 (2016). The Louisiana
statute can be found at LA. STAT. ANN. § 10:3-303 (2016).
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The remaining jurisdictions rely on case law. For example, in 2001
the Second Circuit used a four-part test for proving reliance dam-
ages in a claim of promissory estoppel in Abbruscato v. Empire Blue
Cross & Blue Shield.188 A plaintiff must prove “(1) a promise, (2)
reliance on the promise, (3) injury caused by the reliance, and (4) an
injustice if the promise is not enforced.”189 Additionally, the plaintiff
must prove that there was an “extraordinary circumstance[ ]” for the
promise and subsequent reliance.190
In Abbruscato, a company promised its employees certain life
insurance benefits if they retired early.191 However, after retiring,
the company substantially modified the insurance benefits, which
the retirees found unacceptable.192 The Second Circuit concluded
that inducing the employees to retire early was an extraordinary
circumstance.193 There was a promise to give certain life insurance
benefits, the employees relied on the promise by retiring early, the
reduction in benefits clearly injured the employees, and “an in-
justice [would] result should Empire’s promise not be enforced.”194
Although states have altered the wording of the Second Circuit’s
test, many jurisdictions today still consider, and sometimes award,
reliance damages,195 which means that if video game players can
188. 274 F.3d 90, 100-01 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Kunkel v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
274 F.3d 76, 85 (2d Cir. 2001)). The Second Circuit originally compiled the four elements of
this test from the Restatement of Contracts and American Jurisprudence in Schonholz v.
Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 87 F.3d 72, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1996). Although the Second Cir-
cuit did not change the elements in Abbruscato, they articulated the rule more clearly and
succinctly in Abbruscato, making it ideal as an example in this discussion. See Schonholz, 87
F.3d at 78-79, for more information regarding the specific provisions of the Restatements and
American Jurisprudence used in creating the four elements of the rule.
189. Abbruscato, 274 F.3d at 100 (quoting Kunkel, 274 F.3d at 85).
190. See id. (quoting Kunkel, 274 F.3d at 85).
191. See id. at 94.
192. See id. at 95.
193. See id. at 101.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Barrie-Chivian v. Lepler, 34 N.E.3d 769, 772 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015) (finding
that the statute of frauds did not overcome the fact the plaintiff relied on the oral promise of
defendant to execute a written agreement); Schroeder v. Pinterest Inc., 17 N.Y.S.3d 678, 694
(App. Div. 2015) (dismissing a claim when plaintiff failed to prove any kind of detrimental
reliance since plaintiff neither did or refrained from doing anything after receiving a promise
not to profit from plaintiff’s design in an email); Davis v. Tex. Farm Bureau Ins., 470 S.W.3d
97, 108-09 (Tex. App. 2015) (finding that plaintiff failed to prove a definite and unconditional
promise to settle for $12,000 and therefore failed to meet the essential element of a promis-
sory estoppel claim and was not entitled to reliance damages).
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meet these four elements, then perhaps reliance damages would
serve as an adequate remedy. Of course, finding an explicit “prom-
ise” made by a game developer to the players will rarely ever
happen; however, implied promises may come into play via the
developer’s EULAs and the nature of microtransactions.
B. How Scholars Have Argued Reliance Theory in Prior Video
Game Literature
Game development companies use their EULAs to create li-
censes.196 By licensing the use of their games and all in-game
content, the companies get around the first sale doctrine in copy-
right law197 and maintain full ownership of their content.198
However, even though most EULAs explicitly state that transac-
tions will only give a license over in-game assets, when game
development companies treat players as consumers, the players
come to expect and rely on consumer protection found in the real
world.199 The commodification of game assets causes players to rely
on theories of consumer protection when engaging in microtransac-
tions despite any EULA wording to the contrary.200
Although the majority of game development companies are
careful to make it explicitly clear in their EULAs that in-game
assets are licenses, in an extraordinary case, a game developer
implied in an interview that in-game assets had the same kind of
property rights as real-world property.201 The plaintiff brought suit
when the developer removed a certain piece of virtual property from
196. See Lively, supra note 42, at 346.
197. The relevant provision for the first sale doctrine states that “[n]otwithstanding the
provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made
under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of
the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phono-
record.” 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
198. See Lively, supra note 42, at 345.
199. See Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual
Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2073 (2004).
200. See Paul Riley, Note, Litigating Second Life Land Disputes: A Consumer Protection
Approach, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 877, 883 (2009). Riley defines
commodification as “the buying and selling of virtual items in the [virtual] world using real-
world currency.” Id. at 909.
201. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 596 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
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his account.202 The plaintiff argued that he relied on the game de-
veloper’s statements that the virtual property would have “free and
clear” title, like property in the real world.203 The game developer
answered that the use of the word “title” was simply a metaphor.204
Unfortunately, the court did not get an opportunity to decide if or
how far reliance on the developer’s statements would go because the
case settled out of court.205
The major hurdle in using reliance theory to protect players’
consumer rights is finding the promise made by a game developer.206
However, if commodification of game assets through microtrans-
actions “invites the law in,” as some commentators suggest,207 then
there may still be a promise based on the notion of consumer law in
spite of explicit EULAs stating that the transactions are only for
licenses and not true ownership. The courts will need to balance the
right of the player as a consumer and the intellectual property
rights of the game developer.208 In League of Legend’s case, the
ability to purchase champions—the most essential in-game asset to
even be able to play the game—via microtransactions might be “in-
viting the law in” and giving players a remedy via reliance damages.
C. Reliance Theory and Purchases of Champions and In-Game
Assets in League of Legends
The League of Legends EULA explicitly states that virtual goods,
or in-game assets, are the property of Riot, and that users only
receive a license in the asset.209 However, there is commodification
of these assets through microtransactions.210 Although Riot makes
no explicit promise to its players that their purchases will remain
usable, the commodification of the game assets implies a promise
202. See id. at 596-97.
203. See Riley, supra note 200, at 897-98 (quoting Complaint at 9-10, Bragg, 487 F. Supp.
2d 593 (No. 06-04925)).
204. See id. at 899-900.
205. See id. at 900.
206. There must be a promise in order for there to be reliance. See Abbruscato v. Empire
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 2001).
207. See Riley, supra note 200, at 909 (citing Balkin, supra note 199, at 2046-47).
208. See Lively, supra note 42, at 369.
209. See Terms of Use (NA), supra note 81.
210. See How to Unlock a Champion, supra note 12.
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that players will be able to use their purchases. Because of that
commodification, coupled with the fact that in order to play League
of Legends players generally must purchase champions,211 players
can easily view themselves as consumers and rely on consumer
protection law to meet the “promise” element of the reliance test.212
Regarding the actual reliance portion of the four-pronged reliance
test, League of Legends players rely on the fact that their purchases
of champions or items will remain active. Players not only spend
money or in-game currency, but they can also spend a considerable
amount of time playing and learning the champions they have
purchased. If a player could not rely on the champion to remain
active in their account, then players would have little incentive to
purchase champions or spend hundreds of hours playing with their
purchased champions. League of Legends is a free-to-play game—
this means that in order to install the game and continue playing
the game, the player will never have to spend money for the initial
installation nor submit payments to keep the account active.213
League of Legends’ free-to-play business model of generating
revenue by selling champions, skins, and items through micro-
transactions implies that the player will retain control over his or
her purchases as long as League of Legends continues to operate.
If Riot were to remove a champion permanently, the player would
suffer a harm both through loss of money or in-game currency and
loss of time. For example, when Riot removed the champion Gang-
plank from play during the Burning Tides event, many players felt
harmed and requested refunds for their purchases.214 One player in
211. It is possible to play League of Legends without purchasing champions by relying on
the free-to-play champions that change weekly. See Starter Guide, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS,
https://perma.cc/29GS-E4BX. However, learning the game would be exceedingly difficult, and
probably not much fun to play, if a player attempted to learn and play a new champion every
week.
212. See Riley, supra note 200, at 910 (“This idea that ‘consumers are different’ is an
important theory underlying consumer protection law. It recognizes that the consumer, a
single person, often has neither the power nor the information to appropriately protect her
own interests and that the common law often does not adequately protect these interests
either. Consequently, the legislature must provide the protection that the common law
cannot. The purpose of contract and property law, on the other hand, has little to do with a
rightholder’s special status as a consumer.” (footnotes omitted)).
213. See LoL for Free, supra note 17.
214. See Questions About the Bilgewater Event, supra note 32 (referencing specifically the
post made by user Pearl Millet); see also Matt Liebl, Gangplank Killed off in League of
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particular indicated in a forum post that he had purchased a skin
for Gangplank two days before Gangplank was removed.215 The
harm suffered is explicit in this player’s case. The player, Pearl
Millet, relied on the fact that Gangplank was a playable champion
and would generally always be available for play. Pearl Millet
purchased cosmetic skins based on reliance that the champion
would remain available for use. Refusing to compensate the player
after purchasing skins for a defunct champion imposed a financial
loss on the player. In fact, it is possible that the player never even
got the chance to enjoy his purchase at all.
The way players play League of Legends can be viewed as an
extraordinary circumstance.216 League of Legends has over one
hundred playable champions.217 Generally, players pick a few cham-
pions to learn so they can play competitively with other players. If
a player used Gangplank to “climb the ladder”218 and was ranked in
the top percentage of League of Legends players, then the removal
of Gangplank could hinder his or her ability to play competitively.
Losing the ability to play League of Legends at the skill level a
player spent many hours achieving, and not being able to use skins
purchased through microtransactions, directly affects a player’s
enjoyment of the game. Although a player could always learn a new
champion, if Riot can remove champions on a whim, then players
lose both time and financial investments. If we consider the “in-
justice” prong of the reliance theory test219 as a fairness prong, then
players are being treated unfairly if microtransactional content can
be unilaterally removed without compensation. After all, removing
such content directly affects a player’s ability to actually play the
game.
Legends’ Latest Event, GAMEZONE (July 30, 2015, 9:42 AM), http://www.gamezone.com/
news/gangplank-killed-off-in-league-of-legends-latest-event-3422417 [https://perma.cc/MU4Q-
TLBG].
215. See Questions About the Bilgewater Event, supra note 32 (referencing specifically the
post made by user Pearl Millet).
216. See supra notes 189, 192-94 and accompanying text.
217. See Champions, supra note 160.
218. League of Legends offers a competitive game mode called “Ranked Play” where
players’ skill levels are ranked against each other. See, e.g., NotNert13, Comment to Climbing
the Ladder, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS: F. ARCHIVE (May 18, 2014), http://forums.na.leagueof
legends.com/board/showthread.php?t=4531889 [https://perma.cc/75UL-BDEU]. When a player
moves up in ranking, this is referred to as “climbing the ladder.” See id.
219. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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The four factors considered in a reliance theory analysis show
how players come to rely on the purchasing power of microtrans-
actions. In the case of League of Legends, a player receives a
promise to use microtransactional content through making a pur-
chase. He relies on the promise by actually making the purchase
and investing time using the purchase. There is an injury from the
arbitrary removal of the content through the loss of the purchase
price and possibly loss of invested time using the purchase, and
there is an injustice or inherent unfairness if Riot can arbitrarily
remove content necessary to play the game, or more specifically,
play the game well. Additionally, the implied promise of access to
content should be protected despite EULA language because there
is an exchange of currency for that purchasable content. Protecting
a player’s purchases from arbitrary removal would better balance
players’ consumer rights and perceptions with the intellectual
property rights of the game developers.
CONCLUSION
Currently, EULAs protect game developers and are especially
careful to only grant players a license to the developers’ games and
in-game assets.220 The League of Legends EULA operates in this
way.221 However, courts should not give EULAs and terms of use
agreements ironclad protection, especially when microtransactions
are involved. First, a study has shown that most people do not read
standardized form contracts such as EULAs.222 Although players
assent to the terms when they click the “I accept” box, the reason-
able expectations doctrine or reliance theory of promissory estoppel,
or even both theories, should still maintain some control on the
enforcement of the provisions in the agreement in order to maintain
a balance between the rights of the players and the rights of the
game developer.
220. See, e.g., Terms of Use (NA), supra note 81.
221. See id.
222. See Bakos et al., supra note 46, at 24 (finding that less than 0.1 percent of one
thousand buyers access software companies’ EULAs).
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Neither the consensus approach223 nor Professor Keeton’s classical
approach to the reasonable expectations doctrine224 would enforce
provisions that the consumer/insured did not reasonably expect to
be in the agreement, regardless of whether there was a clause
explicitly stating a provision to the contrary. Players do not typically
read the EULAs,225 but they do expect to be able to have access to
items purchased via microtransactions.226 Although players are only
given a license to play the game and to use any purchased content,
players do have access to that content by having the ability to
actually play the game or actually use their microtransactional pur-
chases. 227 Players can easily understand and expect to no longer
have access to the game if the game stops operating, but they would
not expect an arbitrary removal of content that would render their
purchases useless.228 The reasonable expectations doctrine would
prohibit a game developer from arbitrarily removing purchased
content, regardless of an EULA, because no player would invest into
a game where access to the content would be taken away the very
next day.229 
Alternatively, because microtransactions, by definition, commod-
ify in-game assets, players feel like consumers and they rely on the
game developers’ implicit promise to have access to purchased con-
tent and view themselves as purchasers, who would then have
rights under consumer protection law.230 Especially in cases like
League of Legends, where a player must make purchases to even
play the game,231 the players rely on the game developer to continue
to provide access to the players’ purchases so that they can enjoy
and use the game. Reliance theory’s promissory estoppel could be
used to help prevent loss, or it could at least provide a remedy to
223. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
225. See Bakos et al., supra note 46, at 1.
226. See supra Part III.C.
227. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (referring to the post by user Pearl Millet,
who explicitly indicates that had he known Gangplank would be removed from the game the
very next day, he would not have made the microtransaction).
230. See Balkin, supra note 199, at 2073; Riley, supra note 200, at 883.
231. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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players who lose access to content they relied on being able to utilize
when they made their purchases.232
Whether a player could have brought suit against Riot for remov-
ing Gangplank is a moot point as Riot returned the character to play
a few weeks after his removal.233 However, the champion’s unprece-
dented removal begs the question of whether Riot was within its
rights to remove the champion without compensation to the affected
players. This Note suggests that although current case law would
most likely side in favor of Riot and its EULA terms,234 courts
should balance the interests of players as consumers, emphasizing
the players’ reliance on developers’ implicit promises to content or
their reasonable expectations against the intellectual property
rights of the game developers in order to have a healthier relation-
ship between game developers and their player base.
Chelsea King*
232. Although players were angry that Gangplank was removed suddenly, one of the
reasons this unprecedented removal caused such a controversy was because Riot Games was
not offering refunds for Gangplank or his skins. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
There may not have been such a backlash if Riot had offered refunds, which is how promissory
estoppel could have helped alleviate the situation had courts been involved.
233. See Wouk, supra note 35.
234. See supra Part II.B.
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